Intergovernmental competition can take two forms, through tax competition (exit) or yardstick competition (voice). We show these two forms may a¤ect political equilibria in opposite directions. Tax competition increases the disciplining e¤ect of elections on politicians, but it reduces the selection e¤ect. Yardstick competition works in just the opposite direction. However, the two forms of competition may be complementary as expected welfare is concerned.
Introduction 1
In a representative democracy, elections represent the fundamental way to discipline politicians. Bad or incompetent governments are thrown out of o¢ ce and this threat forces them to behave in the interests of voters. Many observers, however, would agree that the electoral mechanism alone may not be powerful enough and that additional disciplining devices on politicians may be helpful. Not surprisingly, the economists'main contribution to this debate has been to advocate more competition across governments. As competition across …rms reduces extra pro…ts in the market, so competition across governments would reduce political rents. This general idea has taken two main forms, aptly summarized by Albert Hirschman's famous distinction between "exit" and "voice" (Hirschman, 1970) . According to the former, people may escape from too greedy a government either by migrating altogether, as in the Tiebout's tradition, or more realistically, by transferring abroad their mobile assets (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) . It would be di¢ cult to overestimate the practical in ‡uence of this idea. For example, in the debate on the …scal institutions of the European Union, tax competition among member countries is often defended on the grounds of its disciplining e¤ects on the hefty European governments. But there is also a second version of the same idea. Competition across governments might also improve the information set of voters (Salmon, 1987) . With competing governments and correlated economic environments, citizens may engage in more relative performance evaluation (also known as "yardstick competition") across politicians, using observations about the results of governments in other regions or other countries to infer something about the quality of their own governments, so reinforcing the disciplining e¤ects of "voice". According to its supporters, both globalization, with its increase in correlation across national economies, and increased media coverage converge in reinforcing the practical relevance of this form of disciplining device. Indeed, tax and yardstick competition may also go hand in hand; in the EU, for instance, the increased integration of markets and politics, coupled with the increased mobility of factors, have certainly worked in the direction of reinforcing both forms of governmental competition.
Tax and yardstick competition have been separately scrutinized at large in the economic literature, both theoretically and empirically (see below). Their link, however, has not been addressed with the same attention. Does tax competition support the informational advantages of yardstick competition? When both forces are at work, which are the predictions in terms of …scal choices and political equilibria? And which is their joint e¤ect on citizens'welfare? Surprisingly enough, these questions have never been raised in the literature, at least not in formal analyses. The only paper that brie ‡y touches these issues is a recent work by Besley and Smart (2007) 2 . However, they are concerned with the e¤ects of several general …scal restraints on voter's welfare and as a result, they choose a modelling strategy that does not allow them to focus speci…cally on the interaction between the two forms of intergovernmental competition 3 . As the topic is relevant, it is instead important to address it explicitly, in a model where both tax and yardstick competition can be introduced and their e¤ects compared.
In the model of this paper, an incumbent politician takes …scal decisions in a …rst period, hoping to be re-elected at the end of this period to run for a second term. Voters are "rational ignorant"; they do not know precisely the quality of their incumbent and do not have the same information that politicians have on crucial elements (e.g. an exogenous shock) that a¤ect the functioning of the public sector. This informational asymmetry o¤ers "bad" politicians the opportunity, under some conditions, to mimic the good type in the …rst period and be reelected in the second. In this framework, we then introduce tax competition, which reduces the ability of politicians to tax capital income, and yardstick competition, assuming the existence of a second economy, correlated to the …rst, that allows voters to compare the …scal choices of politicians.
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, we show that there is no a-priori reason to believe that the e¤ects of the two forms of intergovernmental competition on political equilibria are the same. Fiscal competition works by reducing the resources a "bad" government can lay his hands on; yardstick competition works by providing the voter with more information to select between "bad" and "good" governments. As the two mechanisms are basically di¤erent, it is not surprising that they may produce di¤erent results. Second, we show if there is a general tendency, this points to a con ‡ict between the two forms of competition. Intuitively, …scal competition, by constraining government's choices on some tax tools, makes the signal (the tax rates) that voters could use to select between bad and good politicians through yardstick competition less informative. In the model, this translates into a larger set of parameters that supports pooling equilibria (between good and bad governments) under tax competition. Third, we show that there is at least one practical important case where the two forms of competition unambiguously con ‡ict. When public expenditure is particularly rigid downwards, because it is formed by public goods that are deemed as important by voters, increasing tax competition unambiguously reduces the informational advantages of yardstick competition. Finally, we show that there is however a sense in which the two forms of government competition can be thought of as complementary. Yardstick competition tends to be bene…cial to voters when bad politicians "pool" in the …rst period, as they are more easily found out; tax competition tends to be bene…cial to voters when bad politicians "separate" in the …rst period, as voters are less exploited. Putting both forms of governmental competition together it might well then be that their joint e¤ect on consumer's welfare may turn out to be positive, despite their con ‡icting e¤ects on political equilibria.
Yardstick competition was introduced in economics by Salmon (1987) and …rst formalized by Besley and Case (1995) , that also o¤er an empirical application to the USA. A theoretical analysis is in Bordignon et als. (2004) and an empirical application to Italian municipalities is o¤ered by Bordignon et als. (2003) . A textbook treatment is in Besley (2006) . Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) o¤er a recent theoretical example, by enquiring on the e¤ect of equalization grants on political equilibria. Revelli (2008) o¤ers an interesting recent empirical application to local media markets in the UK. The literature on tax competition is huge. Wilson (2006) o¤ers a recent survey. The question of whether tax competition is bene…cial or not, and of its e¤ect on political equilibria, was …rst raised by Wilson (1989) and Edwards and Keen (1996) . A recent interesting theoretical example is Eggert and Sorenson (2008) who argue that tax competition leads to too low tax rates on capital even when politicians accumulate rents. Empirical studies on tax competition abound. Trannoy et als. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 derives political equilibria, considering both the case with and without tax competition. Section 4 introduces yardstick competition. Section 5 compares the di¤erent mechanisms and derives the basic result of this paper. Section 6 discusses welfare e¤ects. Section 7 concludes.
The model
Consider an economy with a large number of identical consumers (voters). Each consumer derives utility u(:) from a private good c , a (per capita) public good g and leisure x = (1 l), where l indicates labor supply. We assume the quasilinear form (1) u = c + H(g) + V (1 l) so as to eliminate income e¤ects. Both H(:) and V (:) are increasing and strictly concave functions. Each consumer owns one unit of time and one of a private good, which we later identify with "capital" 4 . This unit of capital can be invested earning a …x return that we normalized to one. Labor wage is also normalized to one. Governments raise tax revenue by taxing either (or both) capital and labor income. The consumer's budget constraint is:
(
where T and t indicate, respectively, the tax rate on capital and labor income and T; t 2 [0; 1]. Governments can use tax revenue to either produce g and/or to accumulate rents. The production function of the public good is stochastic: one unit of revenue produces units of g when the shock is positive and units when the shock is negative, with > > 0: Positive shocks occur with probability q > 0. Government's budget constraint is:
where r indicates (per capita) rents and = f ; g. Governments come of two types. They are either Welfarist (or "good" governments) or they are Leviathans (or "bad" governments). The former are only interested in maximizing the utility of the consumers; the latter are only interested in maximizing rents 5 . Good 4 The assumption of a …x capital endowment is just a simpli…cation; qualitatively, our results below would go through even introducing a consumption-saving choice for the consumer. But notice that this assumption rules out one popular argument in favor of tax competition, the weakening of the time inconsistency problem in capital taxation and its positive e¤ects on saving (see for instance chapter 12 in Persson and Tabellini, 2000) . 5 These assumptions are introduced in order to sharpen the results and to connect the present analysis with the literature derived from Brennan and Buchanan (1980) on tax competition that typically assumes Leviathan governments. As will be clear from what follows, the results would not change qualitatively if we instead assumed that bad governments are "dissonant" politicians or incompetent ones who prefer to earn some rents rather than maximize consumers'welfare (e.g. see Besley, 2006) . For an analysis that focuses explicitly on the di¤erent quality of politicians under centralization and decentralization, see Lockwood and Hindricks (2005) . governments occur with ex ante probability > 0: For technical reasons (in order to guarantee the existence of a pooling equilibrium in pure strategies in all cases considered below 6 ), I assume through the following parametric condition:
The respective utility functions of the two types of government is then:
(4) W (T; t; g) = u(T; t; g) and (5) L(T; t; g) = r = T + tl g where, abusing on notation, we use u(T; t; g) to indicate the indirect utility of the representative consumer given government …scal choices.
The economy lasts two periods 7 . In the …rst, the incumbent politician chooses fT; t; gg. At the end of this period there is an election and either the incumbent or an opponent candidate is elected. The second period is just as the …rst, with the only di¤erence being that there are no elections at the end of this period. Each agent in the economy (the consumer, the two types of governments and the opponent) discounts future at the same rate, 0 < < 1. In order to provide electoral incentives to governments, we assume that the representative citizen does not observe either the realization of the shock or the type of government. However, she knows the stochastic structure of the economy. These assumptions de…ne a dynamic game with incomplete information between the representative voter and the di¤erent types of government. The relevant notion of equilibrium for this game is that of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE); that is, equilibria where the strategies of each agent (the two types of incumbent government, the representative voter, and the opponent) are optimal given the strategies of any other agent, and where, whenever possible, beliefs are sequentially rational in the sense that they are revised according to Bayes'rule. We solve the game for di¤erent hypotheses about intergovernmental competition. For simplicity, in the following, we always assume that Welfarist governments do not play strategically; whatever the realization of the shock, they just do what is better for their citizens in any period. This allows us to …x out-of-equilibrium beliefs in a simple way 8 . We begin by studying political equilibria in a closed economy and in an open economy where capital can also ‡ow abroad. In the next section we introduce yardstick competition.
Political equilibria with and without tax competition
In this section, the game unfolds as follows. At stage 0 of the …rst period, nature moves, by choosing a realization for and a type for the incumbent government and the opponent; at stage 1, the incumbent moves, by choosing the tax rates on capital and labor and by committing on how to split revenue between rents and public good; at stage 2 consumers make their choices and so tax revenue is also determined. At the end of the …rst period, the consumer observes the …scal choices of the incumbent (but not the amount of rents collected) and decides whether to reelect him or elect an opponent. Opponents are also expected to be good with probability : Let ( ; T; t; g) be the posterior probability the consumer assigns to the incumbent to be a good government at the end of the …rst period, as a function of her initial beliefs and the observed …rst period choices (T; t; g). The consumer votes for the incumbent whenever ( ; T; t; g) 9 .
The second period is just as the …rst, except that there is no stage 0. We solve the game by backward induction.
Second period
At stage 2, private sector's choices are as follows. If the economy is closed, capital can only be invested at home, so the only choice the consumer needs to make at this stage concerns her labor supply. The consumer then maximizes max u = (1 T ) + (1 t)l + H(g) + V (1 l) l taking (T; t; g) as given 10 . The …rst order condition gives:
where thorough the paper sub…xes indicate derivatives and asterisks optimal values. Solving, we get :
Morris, 1995 and Bordignon and Minelli, 2001) and it implies that the good government in our model is an "automat" rather than a strategic agent. But notice that this assumption is not very restrictive in the present context. It can be proved that the PBE we derive below would always be equilibria even with strategic welfarist governments, and that they might even be the unique equilibria if one is willing to accept a number of reasonable restrictions on out of equilibrium beliefs (formal results available from the author on request). Lockwood (2005) where concavity of V (:) implies L t (t) < 0: For future reference let us indicate with (t) ((L t (t)t)=L(t)) the tax elasticity of labor supply, and let us also assume t (t) > 0 so as to guarantee the second order condition for government maximization (see below).
Consider then the choices of the two types of incumbents at stage 1. In the second period, as there is no future ahead, each type of government would simply choose his preferred strategy. Welfarist governments do not receive any utility from rents, so they always set r = 0. Leviathan governments do not care for public expenditure, and so they choose g = 0. Concerning taxes, if the incumbent government is a Welfarist and the economy is closed, he chooses (T; t) so as to maximize:
Using (3) and (6), the …rst order conditions for this problem can be written as:
Note from (9) that if T 1; H g (g ) = 1 ; substituting in (10), we get L(t) (t) < 0; implying t = 0: A Welfarist would never choose a distorting source of taxation such as the labor tax, if he had at this disposal (enough) of a lump sum tax such as the capital tax. Let us assume this to be the case for both and 11 .
We can then summarize the choices of the welfarist government in a closed economy in the second period as a G ( ) = ft = 0; T = T ( ); g = g ( )g where g ( ) = H 1 g ( 1 ) and T ( ) = g ( )= :The choices of the Leviathan government are even simpler, as the shock does not a¤ect tax revenue. Whatever the realization of , the Leviathan would simply maximally tax the consumer. His preferred choices in a closed economy are then a B = t = b t; T = 1; g = 0 , where b t is implicitly de…ned by the condition ( b t) = 1: 12 Suppose now we open the economy, allowing for capital to ‡ow abroad. At stage 2, the consumer would now also have the choice of exporting her capital abroad. Clearly, her best choice would be to move her endowment of capital so as to equalize the net-of-tax-return from capital across countries; as an 1 1 This assumption is introduced to sharpen results and save algebra. However, none of our results below depends on it. In particular, if Hg( ) > 1, both propositions (1) and (2), and eqs. (15) and (16) remain unchanged, with the only caveat that g in the formulas should now read g = (1 + t(1; )L(t(1; ))): 1 2 These choices for the Leviathan are of course extreme. One may well image that there are reasons, perhaps constitutional limits on taxation or the simple threat of a revolution, that would forbid even a Leviathan government from completely expropriate his citizens. However, as will be apparent below (see note 21), the assumption of an untamed Leviathan is the one which goes mostly against the main point we make here. e¤ect, if capital is perfectly mobile, any capital tax at home larger than the one applied abroad would drive away all capital from the country. In a (Bertrand) competitive equilibrium across countries, the tax on capital could then only be set equal to zero everywhere. Under less extreme assumptions (various forms of mobility costs), governments would retain some ability to tax capital, but capital taxation would drive away part of the capital from the country.
For analytical simplicity, we capture this e¤ect here by just assuming that when the economy is open, the tax base of the capital tax is reduced to some ; 0 < 1 13 : Notice that if < T ( ) for any realization of ; and the incumbent government is a Welfarist, the latter would now need to use the distorting labor tax to …nance public expenditure. (10) would then hold as an equality, and the optimal level of public good would be determined by the
). Under tax competition, the optimal choices of the good government in the second period are then a Gc ( ) = ft = t c ( ; ); T = ; g = g c ( ; )g, where the sub…x "c" is a reminder that these are the optimal choices under tax competition. We write t c and g c as functions of (in addition to ) to indicate that the force of tax competition (the share of the capital tax base driven away by capital taxation) will generally a¤ect the optimal choices for the two …scal variables. If the incumbent government is instead a Leviathan, under tax competition, his preferred choices are a Bc = t = b t; T = ; g = 0 :
Notice that in the second period the e¤ect of tax competition on consumer welfare strictly depends on the type of government. If the second period incumbent is a Welfarist, tax competition makes the consumer surely worse o¤, as she now has to pay the dead-weight loss of taxation (in addition to tax revenue) and generally enjoys less public good 14 . She is instead better o¤ if the second period incumbent is a Leviathan, as she can now at least save some of her resources from expropriation.
First period
Having solved the game in the second period, let us then move to the …rst. By assumption, good governments do not play strategically and so in the …rst period they again choose either a G ( ) or a Gc ( ), depending on if the economy is closed or open. This immediately implies that if the voter observes in the …rst period …scal choices that would never be possibly taken by the good government, she can only rationally conclude that these choices come from a Leviathan government (that is, ( ; T; t; g) = 0 for all (T; t; g) = 2 a G ( ) (or (T; t; g) = 2 a Gc ( ) if the economy is open)). In turn, this also makes the options for the Leviathan in the …rst period very simple. He might either try to mimic the good government, making choices that this government could also have taken in some cases in the …rst period and hoping that this will result in a re-election; or he may make some di¤erent choices, and in this case he knows that he is going to be defeated at the elections. In the latter case, the best option for him is to immediately choose his preferred strategies and set a B (resp. a Bc if there is tax competition) in the …rst period too.
What the Leviathan actually does depends on the realization of the shock and on , the discount rate. By dominance, the Leviathan would never imitate the good type's choices when = , because this would just induce either zero or negative rents in the …rst period, and even under the optimistic beliefs that he would be guaranteed re-election by doing so, the Leviathan would then prefer to separate immediately (as future rents count less then present ones). If = , on the other hand, the Leviathan could accumulate positive rents in the …rst period if he pretended that = and played the corresponding strategies for the good type. By (3), these rents are easily computed to be just a proportion of total revenue in the …rst period;
The Leviathan would then play this mimicking strategy if his expected utility of doing so were larger than his utility under his best deviation, which is taking maximal rents in the …rst period. Letting p(a G ( )) ( resp. p(a Gc ( )) be the expected probability of being re-elected for the Leviathan when he mimics the choices of the good type, the latter condition can be written as
in the case with tax competition 15 .
To derive p(a G ( )) (resp. p(a Gc ( )) we turn to voter's behavior. The rational voter would of course know that Leviathans are playing these strategies. At the equilibrium, upon observing a G ( ) in the case without tax competition or a Gc ( ) in the case with tax competition, by Bayes'rule, her ex-post beliefs about the type of government are
Solving, we observe that (:) if 1 2 q, which in our case holds true by A:1. The conclusions are therefore that p(a G ( )) (resp. p(a Gc ( ))= 1; e.g. at the equilibrium, the Leviathan is surely going to be re-elected if he plays the mimicking strategy. It then follows from (11) and (12) 
) in an open one, the Leviathan would play the mimicking strategy in the …rst period. On the other hand, if either = , or if = and < in a closed economy (resp. if = and < c in an open one) the only PBE is a separating equilibrium, where each type plays his favorite strategy in the …rst period for each realization of the shock. Notice that for = and (resp. c in an open one) the separating equilibrium cannot be a PBE. In fact, at this equilibrium, voter's ex post beliefs are such that ( ; a G ( )) = 1 (resp.
( ; a Gc ( )) = 1), meaning that the Leviathan would then have a pro…table deviation that breaks the separating equilibrium. Summing up:
in closed economy or iii) = and < c in an open economy, then the only PBE in pure strategies is a separating equilibrium where each type of government plays his preferred choices in each period. At this equilibrium, the welfarist government is re-elected and the Leviathan government defeated, at the elections. If either i) the economy is closed, = , and or ii) the economy is open, = , and c ; then the only PBE in pure strategies is a pooling equilibrium where the Leviathan government plays in the …rst period the corresponding strategies of the good type of government for = . At this pooling equilibrium, both types of government are re-elected."
Hence, elections are not enough to tame completely Leviathans. Under the conditions stated in Proposition 1, Leviathan governments can still harm voters in the …rst period and be re-elected in the second. Tax competition clearly does make a di¤erence: in general, 6 = c , meaning that the support for pooling equilibria is generally di¤erent in the two cases. But before discussing how tax competition a¤ects the electoral game, let us consider …rst the second form of intergovernmental competition, yardstick competition.
Yardstick competition
To study this case, suppose that we now double the previous economy, forming a second economy exactly identical to the …rst. For the consumer to be able to learn something about the type of her government by observing the choices made in the other jurisdiction, the two economies must be somehow related; for simplicity, we consider in this section the simplest case of perfect correlation, meaning that the realization of the shock is the same in both economies 16 . We assume instead that the choices by nature of the types of government in the two economies are independently made.
The game evolves as follows. At stage zero of the …rst period, nature chooses both the realization of the shock (common to the two economies) and the types of government in the two economies. Each government knows the realization of the shock and his type; he does not observe the type of the government chosen in the other jurisdiction 17 . At stage 1 of the …rst period, both governments independently and simultaneously select the tax rates for their economy. Then citizens make their moves and tax revenue and public good supply are realized. Elections simultaneously take place in both economies. The second period is identical to the …rst, with the only di¤erence that there is no stage 0 and the are no elections at the end of this period. The game ends here.
As in the previous section, we suppose that welfarist governments do not play strategically. By repeating the previous argument, it is easy to show that in the second period the two types of governments would just choose their preferred strategy, as there are no elections ahead. In the …rst period, if = , the best choices for the two Leviathans in the …rst period would still be to grab as much as possible immediately and accept defeat at the ensuing elections. But if = , Leviathans can still earn positive rents by pretending = and playing the corresponding strategies for the good type. If mimicking is a convenient choice for the Leviathan, it depends again on the discount rate and the behavior of voters.
The posterior beliefs of voters in jurisdiction i, i , are now a function of the choices observed in both economies: i = ( ; T i ; t i ; g i ; T j ; t j ; g j ) i; j = 1; 2: Consider …rst the case without tax competition. At an equilibrium where both Leviathans are known to play the good type's negative shock strategies when = , the posterior beliefs of voters can be derived as follows. If the voter observes anything di¤erent from either (t = 0; T ( ); g ( )) or (t = 0; T ( ); g ( )) in her economy, she knows for sure that her incumbent is a bad type as the good type would never make these moves ( i = 0): If she observes (t = 0; T ( ); g ( )), she knows for sure that her incumbent is of the good type as the bad type would never make these choices (by dominance), and i = 1. If she observes (t = 0; T ( ); g ( )) in her economy, but (t = 0; T ( ); g ( )) abroad, she would immediately understand that her incumbent government is a Leviathan who is attempting to fool her ( i = 0). If instead she observes (t = 0; T ( ); g ( )) in both economies, her revised beliefs can be derived by Bayes'rule as follows:
It follows that the voter would elect the incumbent if 1 2 , which in our case again holds true by A.1. Hence, the expected utility of the Leviathan by playing this strategy is R(1; ) + (1 ) (1 + b tL( b t)); the Leviathan would then play this strategy, if this expected utility is larger than the utility of deviating immediately and collecting maximal rents, that is if (1 ) : By repeating the same argument for the case of tax competition, it is immediately seen that everything would go through except that the condition for pooling would now become c (1 ) . We can then state:
Proposition 2 "Suppose there are two identical, perfectly correlated economies, with independently chosen types of governments and that A:1 holds. If = , then the only PBE is one where both types of governments play their favorite strategy in the …rst period and the bad type is defeated at the elections. This separating PBE also occurs if = , and < (1 ) under no tax competition and < c (1 ) under tax competition. If = , and (1 ) under no tax competition and c (1 ) under tax competition, there exists a PBE in pure strategies where the bad type plays the corresponding strategy of the good type for = . At this pooling equilibrium, the bad type is re-elected if the government in the other jurisdiction also happens to be Leviathan and is defeated otherwise." 18 Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we immediately observe: 
with tax competition.
The corollary then illustrates the basic e¤ect of yardstick competition; it allows citizens to better select between di¤erent types of governments. 19 By knowing that he will be found out with higher probability when cheating, the Leviathan prefers to deviate immediately in a larger number of cases, thus providing citizens with useful information for the ensuing elections. But this information does not come freely. The Leviathan now exploits more fully the citizen in the …rst period than he would if he had some chances of re-election; and since the future advantages for citizens are uncertain, it may well be that citizens end up by being worse o¤ as a result of yardstick competition. We will come back to this in section 6. 1 8 But notice that, di¤erently from the previous case, a separating PBE under yardstick competition always exists, even for ) ). Intuitively, if a bad incumbent expects the bad incumbent of the other jurisdiction to play the separating strategy in the …st period, his best strategy is also to separate. 1 9 Strictly speaking, this is not always the case. Even in the context of our model, for instance, if we had assumed > q > 1 2 ; pooling behaviour would have been only possible under yardstick competition. Still, as proposition 2 shows, whenever a pooling equilibria exists without yardstick competition, introducing it has the e¤ect of reducing the support for pooling equilibria. See Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (1994) for a further discussion of these issues.
Yardstick versus tax competition
We are …nally ready to make our comparison. We focus on political equilibria in this section and on welfare e¤ects in the following. Unambiguously, in the context of our assumptions, yardstick competition works by enforcing more separation in the …rst period between di¤erent types of incumbents. Which are the e¤ects of adding tax competition to this framework? To clarify issues, let us propose the following de…nition:
De…nition 4 Tax and yardstick competition reinforce each other if the interval of parameters which support pooling equilibria in the …rst period further shrinks as an e¤ ect of introducing tax competition in the economy; tax and yardstick competition con ‡ict in the opposite case.
Referring back to Propositions 1 and 2, it is clear that these two cases can be assessed by simply comparing the conditions on the discount rate for supporting pooling equilibria in the two cases, with and without tax competition. That is, tax competition con ‡icts with yardstick competition if c < , while tax competition reinforces yardstick competition in the opposite case.
By recalling the de…nitions for c and above, it is not a fortiori clear whether tax competition reinforces or con ‡icts with yardstick competition. To get a better intuition, let us manipulate the formulas to obtain:
highlights a number of interesting features 20 . First, any exogenous constraint on the maximal tax rate the Leviathan can raise, or on the minimum level of public good he has to o¤er, resulting in a lower maximum level of rents, would certainly work towards more pooling under tax competition 21 . That is, as anticipated above, our assumption of an untamed Leviathan is the one that works mostly in favour of greater separation as a result of tax competition. Second, m( ) > 0. To see this, note the denominator of m( ) is certainly positive (as g (1) > g c ( )) and that the numerator of m( ) is also positive, as g c ( ) > , g (1) = T and T 0 as T 1.
2 0 In (15), for simplicity, we dropped the dependence of g (:) on as is known that both levels of public expenditures are evaluated at = : The case with no tax competition is captured in (15) by writing = 1 in g(:) . 2 1 To see this, suppose that when separating the Leviathan can now only impose a maximum labor tax t 0 b t and needs o¤er a minimum level of public good g 0 0: Computing the new values of c and for this case and solving, (15) would now become:
Intuitively, there are two main forces at play in determining if b tL( b t) is larger or smaller than m( ). The …rst hinges on the importance of public expenditure for voters. If voters value g very highly, so much that in spite of having to use the distorting labor tax to …nance public expenditure, the good government would still attempt not to reduce too much public good supply, g (1) would be not too far from g c ( ). Then m( ) would become very large, pushing toward more pooling under tax competition. Intuitively, if g (1) is not very far from g c ( ), the rents that the Leviathan government can accumulate when pooling in the …rst period do not fall very much under tax competition (as they are proportional to revenue and therefore to public expenditure). Hence, since the rents that he can grab by separating are instead reduced by 1 as an e¤ect of tax competition, the Leviathan is led to pool more in the …rst period.
The second force hinges on (t) the elasticity of the labor tax base. If raises very fast with t, g c ( ) will be much smaller than g (1) , rents when pooling in the …rst period for the Leviathan will fall a great deal, and m( ) will become smaller. This will push toward more separation. But notice that if raises very fast with t, b tL( b t) also falls quickly, pushing toward more and not less pooling in the …rst period.
To see these e¤ects more precisely, let us di¤erentiate (10) (that holds as an equality under tax competition) with respect to and take a …rst order approximation. We get 22 :
Hggg Hg > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal utility for public expenditure and where all terms in s(:) are evaluated at a Gc ( ): The two forces discussed above are clearly represented in this formula. s(:) lies between zero and one. If t is very small and/or is very large, s(:) ! 0 and g c ! g implying from (15) that tax competition will certainly induce more pooling behavior. On the other hand, if t is very large and/or is very small, s(:) ! 1, and m( ) tend to its minimal value, (1 T ) T . However, in this case, b tL( b t) also falls, making the total e¤ect generally ambiguous. Getting general results from (15) is di¢ cult. But analytical examples and simulations (see the working paper version of this work, Bordignon (2005) for details) suggest that even with a very elastic labor tax base, it is only for very low values of (around 0.1) that we could get c > , that is, more separation under tax competition. If one interprets g as per capita total public expenditure in modern developed countries, including welfare systems, such low levels of appears clearly implausible.
Our basic conclusion is therefore that there is a tendency for tax competition to lead to more pooling in the …rst period, so con ‡icting with yardstick competition. Perhaps, the simplest way to understand our results is the following. As argued by Besley and Smart (2007) , elections have both a "disciplining" e¤ectforcing governments to behave more in the interests of voters-and a "selection" e¤ect -allowing citizens to discriminate between good and bad governments. Tax and yardstick competition a¤ect this trade o¤ in opposite directions. Tax competition, by reducing the resources a bad government can expropriate, generally works in the direction of increasing the disciplining e¤ect. Yardstick competition, by enlarging the information set of voters, works by reinforcing the selection e¤ect. Putting them together, it is then not too surprising that the two forms of government competition may con ‡ict one with the other.
Welfare analysis 23
This conclusion only refers to the type of political equilibria which would occur under either tax or yardstick competition. But the truly interesting question is how the two forms of intergovernmental competition a¤ect voter's welfare and in particular whether they con ‡ict on these grounds too. We begin by noticing that adding either form of intergovernmental competition a¤ects consumer's welfare in two di¤erent ways. First, by possibly changing the political equilibria in the …rst period, switching it from pooling to separating under yardstick competition and from separating to pooling (assuming our previous conclusions to hold) in the case of tax competition. Second, by possibly changing the expected utility of the consumer at any given political equilibrium. Bearing this distinction in mind, it is immediate to see that, at unchanged political equilibrium, yardstick competition can only be (weakly) bene…cial for the voter. In fact, if the original equilibrium was separating and remains separating after the introduction of yardstick competition, nothing changes for the voter. But if the original equilibrium was pooling, and remains pooling after the introduction of yardstick competition, the voter is certainly better o¤. In fact, when the incumbent is bad in the …rst period and pools, he is now re-elected with probability 1 only (e.g. if the other incumbent also turns out to be bad) while he was surely re-elected (in the context of our assumptions) when there was no yardstick competition 24 .
Matters are no so simple for tax competition. In fact, even at unchanged political equilibria, tax competition constraints the …scal choices that can be made by both bad and good governments in both periods and the net e¤ect on consumer welfare is in general uncertain. So, for example, if the original equilibrium was separating and remains such after the introduction of tax competition, tax competition certainly increases consumer's welfare in the …rst period if the incumbent is bad (because the consumer is less exploited when the bad type separates), but it reduces it in the second period if a good type is elected (as this has to make larger use of a distorting source of taxation to …nance expen-diture). The opposite holds if the original equilibrium is pooling and remains such after the introduction of tax competition. It can be shown that the crucial variable that determines whether tax competition is harmful or bene…cial for the consumer is (t ), the value of the labor tax elasticity at the equilibrium with distorting taxation. In particular, if (t ) is larger than some threshold b , tax competition is certainly harmful for the consumer in both political equilibria. But if (t ) < b , tax competition increases expected consumer's welfare at the separating equilibrium, and if (t ) falls even further, tax competition might turn out to be bene…cial even at the pooling equilibrium. The results are intuitive. (t ) measures the cost for the consumer to switch to a distorting source of taxation 25 ; and if this cost is low, it is worth paying for her, as tax competition reduces by (1 ) the loss she su¤ers when the bad type plays his favorite strategy.
However, the two forms of competition may also change the support for the pooling equilibrium and if the equilibrium in the …rst period switches as a result of the introduction of either type of competition, the above results could be easily reverted. Introducing simultaneously both forms of intergovernmental competition make the results even messier, as the two forms of competition a¤ect consumer welfare di¤erently in any type of equilibrium, and the equilibrium itself may switch from separating to pooling (if ): General results are clearly very di¢ cult to obtain. Still, there is a general insight that is worth stressing. As shown above, tax competition tends to switch the equilibrium from separating to pooling, and for the same reason, it is potentially more bene…cial to voters when bad politicians "separate" in the …rst period. Yardstick competition tends to switch the equilibrium from pooling to separating, and for the same reason, it is more bene…cial to voters when bad politicians "pool" in the …rst period. From this perspective, the two forms of intergovernmental competition can indeed be thought of as complements, as their joint inclusion tends to neutralize the e¤ect on political equilibria, while possibly increasing consumer's welfare at each of these equilibria 26 .
As a …nal comment, notice that we have so far treated yardstick and tax competition as separate and independent phenomena. But in fact they are likely to be related. For instance, if we had assumed that our two economies were only partially positively correlated, as in Bordignon et als. (2004) , it would have been easy to show, under A.1, that the conditions which support pooling equilibria under yardstick competition become more and more restrictive (e.g. the threshold parameter that supports pooling equilibrium increases) as the correlation between the two economies increases (see proposition 3 in Bordignon et als. (2004)). On empirical grounds, one should then expect to see more 2 5 Recall from (10) that Hg(g c ) = 1 (1 (t c )) ; hence, the equilibrium value for (t c ) depends on both a demand and a supply factor (e.g. how fast (t) increases with t). 2 6 Indeed, in the knife edge case c 1 = , providing that (t ) is not too large, their joint e¤ect on consumers'welfare is certainly positive, whatever the political equilibrium in the …rst period.
politicians being unseated at the elections as a result of increasing correlation among economies. Say, the process of market integration in the EU should also a¤ect the political cycles in the di¤erent countries, making it easier for voters to discriminate between good and bad governments. But increasing integration of markets is also likely to increase tax competition (reducing in our model), making the general e¤ect ambiguous. It would be interesting if future empirical research succeeded in disentangling these two di¤erent e¤ects.
Concluding remarks
Elections are the main way used in democracies to discipline governments. Economists argue that competition among governments may also play a useful role. But governmental competition can take two forms; either through tax or through yardstick competition. In this paper, we develop a simple model which allows us to study the e¤ects on political equilibria and welfare of both forms of governmental competition. The paper shows that the two forms of competition may, and in general do, con ‡ict as political equilibria are concerned. Tax competition increases the disciplining e¤ect of elections on politicians, but it reduces the selection e¤ect. Yardstick competition works in just the opposite direction. However, the two forms of competition may be complementary as welfare is concerned; yardstick competition, by reducing the future losses of citizens when the disciplining e¤ect is prevailing; tax competition, by reducing the present losses of citizens when the selection e¤ect dominates. Hence, in expected terms, their joint inclusion in the economy may turn out to be bene…cial for citizens. 8 Technical appendix: not for publication 8 
.1 Strategic good governments
Consider again the game described in sections 2-3 of the paper. We maintain all assumptions unchanged, but we suppose now that the Welfarist governments also play strategically. We wish to characterize all the PBE of the game in this case, focusing again on pure strategy equilibria. As in the main text, the agents of the game are the two types of incumbent, the voter and the opponent. A strategy for the incumbent government is a function specifying, for each of his possible types, a set of actions a( ) = ft( ); T ( ); g( )g in each of the two periods and for each of the realizations of , where 0 t( ) 1; 0 T ( ) , 1 and T ( ) + t( )L(t( )) g( ) : A strategy for the voter is a choice between the incumbent and the challenger at the end of the …rst period, as a function of the observed level of ft; T; gg in the …rst period. A strategy for the challenger is a choice of a( ) in the second period.
Consider the following list of all possible types of pure strategy PBE that can occur in this game. We de…ne as full pooling equilibrium a PBE where in the …rst period the two types of incumbent make the same choices for any realization of , that is where a B ( ) = a G ( ) = a 0 ( ) for = f ; g : We de-…ne as full separating equilibrium a PBE where in the …rst period each type of government plays his short term favorite strategy, that is, where a G ( ) = ft = t c ( ; ); T = ; g = g c ( ; )g and a B = t = b t; T = ; g = 0 in the notation used in the paper. We use the term pooling equilibrium ( or partial pooling equilibrium) to indicate the PBE we have focussed on in the main text, where the bad type plays in the …rst period the same choice the good type would have played for a di¤ erent realization of the shock; i.e. a B ( ) = a G ( 0 ) for 6 = 0 , ; 0 = f ; g. Finally, we use the generic term separating equilibrium to indicate a PBE where the two types play di¤erent strategies in the …rst period i.e. a B ( ) 6 = a G ( 0 ) and a B ( ) 6 = a G ( ) for 6 = 0 , ; 0 = f ; g, but where these strategies may not coincide with the favorite ones of each type:
We again solve the game by backward induction. In the second period, as there is no future ahead, each incumbent government plays his favorite strategy: a G ( ); a B : Let us then focus on the …rst period. We introduce the following notation. Let b R = b tL( b t) + be the maximal rents that the bad type can grab by playing his favorite strategy in each period. Let e R(a 0 ( k ); j ) = T 0 ( k ) + t 0 ( k )L(t 0 ( k )) g 0 ( k ) j be the …rst period rents that the bad type grabs in the …rst period by mimicking and playing a 0 ( k ) (the good type strategy for shock k ), when the true realization of the shock is j , where j ; k = f ; g and j may be di¤erent from k Consider …rst the full pooling equilibrium. Using the notation above, necessary conditions for the existence of this equilibrium are:
U is the utility of the consumer when the bad type plays the fully expropriating strategy. If either (i) or (ii) are violated, one of the two types of incumbent would prefer to deviate and play his favorite strategy, even if he expected that by deviating he would be defeated at the election, while if he played the full pooling strategy he would be re-elected for sure. Letting e U = 0 for simplicity, (ii) can be rewritten more simply as (ii) U (a 0 ( )) U (a G ( ))(1 (1 ) ), 8 At the full pooling equilibrium, ( ; a 0 ( )) = ; under our assumption on how the citizen votes when indi¤erent, this means that each type of incumbent is always re-elected by playing the full pooling strategy. In turn, this also means that the necessary conditions (i) and (ii) are also su¢ cient for the existence of a PBE, provided that out-of-equilibrium beliefs are de…ned accordingly 27 . For example, if we set ( ; a( )) = 0 for all a( ) 6 = a 0 ( ) and (i) and (ii) are satis…ed, the proposed full pooling equilibrium is a PBE of the game.
However, one could argue that these out-of-equilibrium beliefs are "unreasonable" as they implicitly assume that the bad agent could play a dominated strategy. Speci…cally, the rational consumer should realize that a G ( ) is a dominated strategy for the bad type 28 and should therefore assign probability 1 to the incumbent being of the good type upon observing a G ( ); e.g. ( ; a G ( )) = 1: But this also implies that, when = ; the good type has a pro…table deviation: playing a G ( )) and be re-elected for sure. This pro…table deviation destroys the proposed equilibrium. The conclusion is that under reasonable beliefs the full pooling equilibrium cannot be a PBE of the game.
Consider then the full separating equilibrium. At this equilibrium, ( ; a G ( )) = 1 and ( ; a B ) = 0: But this immediately implies that for
(1 e R(a G ( ); ) b R ), the full separating equilibrium cannot be a PBE. When = the bad type has a pro…table deviation, playing a G ( ) and be re-elected, that destroys the full separating equilibrium. The conclusion therefore is that for , the full separating equilibrium cannot a PBE of the game. Consider next the (partial) pooling equilibrium. Under the restriction that out of equilibrium beliefs have to be reasonable, in the …rst period the good type certainly plays a G ( ) when = and plays another choice, say a 00 ( ); when the shock is low. The bad type responds by playing a B when the shock is low and a 00 ( ) when the shock is high. By A.1, the bad type is certainly re-elected when he plays a 00 ( ) in the …rst period. Necessary conditions for the existence of this equilibrium are:
R(a 00 ( ); ) (1 ) b R (iv)U (a 00 ( )) U (a G ( ))(1 (1 ) ) If (iii) and (iv) are satis…ed, by specifying accordingly out of equilibrium beliefs, we can support the partial pooling equilibrium as a PBE of the game; for instance, by setting ( ; a( )) = 0 for all a( ) 6 = a 00 ( ); a G ( ) . Observe 2 7 Note that this also requires e R(a 0 ( ); ) = e R(a 0 ( ); ) or otherwise the bad type would have a pro…table deviation that would break the full pooling equilibrium. 2 8 The bad type never gets any rents in the …rst period by playing this strategy and would therefore be better o¤ by separating immediately that the set of partial pooling equilibria is certainly not empty; at a 00 ( ) = a G ( ) and
(iii) and (iv) are satis…ed so that, under the out of equilibrium beliefs speci…cation above, this is certainly a PBE of the game. But there could be other values of a 00 ( ) (more precisely, a continuum of them) which also satisfy (iii) and (iv) and that therefore constitute a PBE.
To make further progress, let b a( ) = arg max n U (a; ) s:t: e R(a;
that is, b a( ) is the best strategy that the good government could play in the …rst period, when the shock is , still making the bad type indi¤erent between separating and pooling: Notice that if U (b a( )) >U (a 00 ( )) there certainly exists a deviating strategy that would make the good government better o¤ in the …rst period and force the bad type to separate. For instance, at a =b a( ) the good type could in…nitesimally reduce b t( ), letting b g( ) and b T ( ) unchanged. This would make the consumer (and the good government) surely better o¤ in the …rst period, while reducing the bad type's …rst period rents and therefore forcing him to separate. What prevents the good type from playing this deviating strategy is his expectation, under our out of equilibrium beliefs speci…cation above, that by doing so he would be defeated at the elections, and condition (iv) guarantees that the good type is then better o¤ by sticking to the pooling strategy and playing a 00 ( ) instead.
But, in the spirit of the well known Cho and Kreps (1987) "equilibrium dominance" criterion 29 one could argue that these out of equilibrium expectations are "unconvincing". To understand why, notice that the bad type would certainly be worse o¤ with respect to the (partial) pooling equilibrium payo¤s if he played the deviating strategy in the …rst period, while the good type would be better o¤. Hence, the voter, who expects the two types of incumbent government to play the partial pooling equilibrium strategies, upon observing the deviation described above, should reason that only the good type could play this deviation, and re-elect him. If one accepts this argument, the conclusion is then that the pooling equilibrium can be sustained only if the condition U (a 00 ( )) U (b a( )) is added to (iii) and (iv). This still leaves us with many possible equilibrium values for a 00 ( ): But note that a 00 ( ) = a G ( ) always satis…es U (a 00 ( )) U (b a( )); and for = ; a 00 ( ) = a G ( ) is the only …rst period equilibrium choice that satis…es this additional condition. Intuitively, a G ( ) is the strategy that maximizes the good type welfare in the …rst period when = ; and at the partial pooling equilibrium the good type is always re-elected by playing this strategy. Hence, there is no other strategy that he could play in the …rst period that is going to make him better o¤. We conclude that, for "convincing" out of equilibrium beliefs and , a 00 ( ) = a G ( ) is the only choice which can be part of the (partial) pooling equilibrium strategies.
Consider …nally the separating equilibrium. At this equilibrium, under our requirement that out of equilibrium beliefs need be reasonable, the good type plays a G ( ) when the shock is high and another choice, say a 000 ( ); when the shock is low. The bad type always plays a B . For this to be an equilibrium, the following conditions need be satis…ed (v) e R(a 000 ( ); ) < (1 ) b R (vi)U (a 000 ( )) U (a G ( ))(1 (1 ) ) to support this as a PBE we need to specify out of equilibrium beliefs accordingly; for instance, by setting ( ; a( )) = 0 for all a( ) 6 = a 000 ( ); a G ( ) . Under these out of equilibrium beliefs, the separating equilibrium is a PBE of the game.
Notice that what prevents the good type, at the separating equilibrium, from playing his maximization choice in the …rst period is his expectation that ( ; a G ( )) = 0, that is, his expectation that the voter, by observing the choice that would maximize her utility in the …rst period when the realization of the shock is , would conclude that the incumbent is a bad type who is trying to fool her. We now inquiry about the "justi…ability" of this expectation. McLennan (1985) suggests that "justi…able" out of equilibrium beliefs must be based on the presumption that "deviations from the equilibrium path are more probable if they can be explained in terms of some confusion over which sequential equilibrium is in e¤ect" . Applying this idea here, we notice that under A.1, and our previous restrictions on out of equilibrium beliefs, the only pure strategy equilibria in which the voter could observe a G ( ) in the …rst period are the (partial) pooling equilibria. Hence, observing a G ( ) in the …rst period should be interpreted by the voter as a signal that the (partial) pooling equilibrium is being played. But then the beliefs of the voter, upon observing a G ( ), should be consistent with the (partial) pooling equilibrium. And under A.1, at the partial pooling equilibrium, the good type is re-elected for sure upon playing a G ( ) in the …rst period. a G ( ) is then a pro…table deviation for the good type that destroys the separating equilibrium.
Summing up, our general conclusion is that under A.1 and the restrictions that out of equilibrium beliefs need to be reasonable, convincing and justi…able, the only pure strategy PBE of the game, when
; is the partial pooling equilibrium. At this equilibrium, the good type plays a G ( ); the bad type separates when = , and plays a G ( ) when .
Corner solution for the capital tax
Consider again the FOC for the good government's optimal choices without tax competition:
(9) T : 1 + H g (:) 0; T 1 (10) t : L(t) + H g (:) (L(t) + tL t (t)) = L(t) + H g (:) L(t)(1 (t)) 0; t 0:
and suppose now that at T = 1 ; H g ( T ) > 1; for both realizations of . Hence, (10) holds as an equality and t > 0 even without tax competition. Introducing tax competition, T = < 1 and (10), at fortiori, holds as an equality, and t c > 0: Let t (1; ) be the optimal tax without tax competition and t c ( ; ) with tax competition. It follows g = (1 + t (1; )L(t (1; )) and g c = ( + t ( ; )L(t ( ; )). Working through the model, it is clear that propositions 1 and 2 go through una¤ected with the only di¤erence that now R(1; ) in the de…nition of should read R(1; ) = 1 + t (1; )L(t (1; ). Equation (15) also goes through with only di¤erence that now in (15) g (1) = g = (1 + t (1; )L(t (1; )): Using a linear approximation, g (1)
g c ( ) + (@g c ( )=@ )(1 ) with @g c ( )=@ > 0 from (10) . Hence g (1) > g c ( ) and the denominator of (15) is positive:Substituting in the numerator of (15), g c ( ) g (1) = (1 )(g c ( ) + @g c ( )=@ ) > 0. Hence m( ) > 0: Assume now = 1 and notice: @g c ( )=@ = 1 + L(t( )(1 (t( ))dt=d : Di¤erentiating (10), dt=d = Hg g (1 ) (Hg g L(1 ) 2 Hg t) . Substituting, and using the fact that H g (g c ) = (1 (t c )) 1 from (10), (16) in the paper.
Welfare analysis
Let u( ; ) be the maximum utility that a consumer can get when the taxable capital tax base is and the shock is ; 0 < 1; = f ; g; e.g. her utility under the …scal choices of a Welfarist government. Let #u( ; ) = qu( ; ) + (1 q)u( ; ) her expected utility under the Welfarist government, where expectations are taken with respect to the realization of :Finally, let e u( ); 0 < 1 be consumer's utility under a Leviathan government, when the latter plays the fully exploiting strategy.
Tax competition: (1) Separating equilibria
Suppose < c < : This means that the original PBE is separating without tax competition and remains such even after introducing tax competition. Using the notation above, the expected utility of the consumer Eu( ; ) in this regime (where expectations are taken with respect to the realization of the type of government) can be written as:
(A:1)Eu( ; ) = (#u( ; )+ #u( ; ))+(1 )(e u( )+ ((1 )e u( )+ #u( ; )) Letting Eu(1; ) indicate the expected utility of the consumer without tax competition ( = 1), the e¤ect of the introduction of tax competition on consumer welfare can be evaluated by computing (A:2)Eu(1; ) Eu( ; ) = (#u(1; ) #u( ; ))( (1 + (2 ) ) +(e u(1) e u( ))((1 )(1 + (1 ))
Tax competition is then bene…cial for the consumer if:
(A:3)e u( ) e u(1) > (1 + (2 ) (1 )(1 + (1 )) (#u(1; ) #u( ; ))
Note that e u( ) e u(1) = 1 : Note further that by di¤erentiating (10) wrt we get:
where t is the optimal choice for t given and the realization of : Using a linear approximation, (A:5)#u(1; ) #u( ; ) + (T )(q@u( ; )=@ + (1 q)@u( ; )=@ ) = #u( ; ) + (T )(q (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) + (1 q) (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) )
Substituting for (A.5) in (A.3) and using the fact that e u( ) e u(1) = 1 , tax competition is then bene…cial if:
( ) 1 T
(1 )(1 + (1 )) (1 + (2 ) ) > q (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) + (1 q) (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) E( (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) )
Tax competition: (2) Pooling equilibria
Suppose c < < : This means that the political equilibrium is pooling without tax competition and remains pooling after introducing tax competition. The expected welfare of the consumer in this case is: Using again Eu (1; ) to indicate the expected utility of the consumer without tax competition:
(A:7)Eu(1; ) Eu( ; ) = (#u(1; ) #u( ; ))( (1 + )) +(e u(1) e u( ))(1 )((1 q)(1 + (1 )) + q ) +(u(1; ) u( ; ))((1 )(1 q) + (1 )q)
(A:8)(#u(1; ) #u( ; ))( (1 + )) +(u(1; ) u( ; ))((1 )(1 q) + (1 )q) (1) < (e u( ) e u(1))(1 )((1 q)(1 + (1 )) + q )
or, using again e u( ) e u(1) = 1 and (A.5), if ( ) 1 T > E( (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) ) (1 + ) (1 )((1 q)(1 + (1 )) + (t ( )) 1 (t ( ))
that is, again, if the value of (t ( )) is su¢ ciently low (e.g. for (t ( )); (t ( )) ! 0), tax competition might be bene…cial for the consumer even if the political equilibrium is, and remains, pooling after the introduction of tax competition. To compare (*) with (**), let E( (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) ) = S and let (t ( )) 1 (t ( )) = P . It follows that (*) and (**) can be rewritten as (*) 1 T > (1+(2 ) 0 )
(1 )(1+ 0 (1 )) S and (**) 1 T > (1+ 00 ) (1 )((1 q)(1+ 00 (1 )) S + (1 q) 00 +q (1 q)(1+k 00 (1 )) P where 00 > > c > 0 . Let k = 00 0 > 1: It follows that (**) is more restrictive than (*) if (1 + k 0 ) (1 )((1 q)(1 + k 0 (1 )) S + (1 q)k 0 + q (1 q)(1 + k 0 (1 )) P > (1 + (2 ) 0 ) (1 )(1 + 0 (1 )) S At = 1; S = P: Substituting and computing, it can be shown that for k large enough, the RHS of (**) is larger than the RHS of (*), meaning that (**) is indeed more restrictive than (*) 30 . That is, there exists a value of (t ) small enough to make tax competition bene…cial for the consumer at the separating regime, but still harmful for the consumer at the pooling regime. At fortiori, this holds for > 1 too, as > 1 implies P > S: If < 1, S > P and the comparison becomes more uncertain. (**) would be still more restrictive than (*) for k large enough, but the sign could be reversed as P becomes smaller and smaller. In the extreme case P ! 0; (*) is more restrictive than (**). But notice from eqs. (15) and (16) that this case is hardly compatible with c < :
Tax competition: (3) Switching political equilibria
Suppose c < < : This means that introducing tax competition shifts the equilibrium in the …rst period from separating to pooling. The e¤ect on welfare can again be captured by subtracting Eu( ; ) from Eu(1; ), where the latter is evaluating at the separate equilibrium and the former at the pooling one:
(A:9)Eu(1; ) Eu( ; ) = (#u(1; ) #u( ; )) ((1 + (2 ) ) (e u( ) e u(1))(1 )(1 + ((1 ) +(1 )q(e u( ) + u( ; ) u( ; ))
As can be checked, the …rst two terms on the RHS are identical to (A.2). Hence, the conditions for tax competition to be bene…cial for the consumer are more (less) restrictive than (*) depending on if e u( ) + u( ; ) > (<)u( ; ): :This means that the equilibrium is separating in the benchmark case and remains separating upon introducing yardstick competition. Clearly nothing changes for the consumer. Case 2. Suppose < :
Yardstick competition
1 < : This means that the original equilibrium is pooling and remains pooling under yardstick competition. Letting Eu Y (1; ) be 3 0 For instance, at = 1, k > 1 02 is a su¢ cient condition for the RHS of (**) to be larger than the RHS of (*). But even for k ! 1 the RHS of (**) would be larger than the RHS of (*) if 02 > (1 q )(1 + 0 (1 )).
the expected utility with yardstick competition and Eu(1; ) the one without it, the welfare e¤ect of introducing yardstick competition can be computed as The sign is uncertain.
Tax and yardstick competition
Here there are three cases to consider and eight sub-cases.
(a)
